“Hostility needs no agreement, but friendship demands mutual consent—something India and Pakistan have repeatedly failed to establish over the past several decades.”
“Pakistan and India remain locked in an uneasy calm. Diplomatic relations are tense, political leaders remain disconnected, and public engagement is minimal. Although peace holds for now, there is little urgency on either side to shift the status quo.”
“Hostility demands no approval, but friendship rests on mutual agreement—something that has consistently eluded India and Pakistan for decades. The most sustained attempt to reach such an understanding took place during the leadership of President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, as detailed in Ambassador Satish Lambah’s In his memoirs . “The pursuit was left unresolved, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has exhibited little inclination toward its revival, much less its realization.”
With Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari set to visit Goa for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting tomorrow, this moment presents an opportune time to reflect on the recent trajectory of India-Pakistan relations—and to consider whether the prospect of rapprochement remains within reach.
The present struggles under the legacy of the past…
The violent division of British India created lasting bitterness. Mass migration, communal violence, and the hurried, disputed borders laid the foundation for mistrust. Multiple wars—especially over Kashmir—have entrenched hostilities. Each conflict has added layers of resentment and unresolved issues that shape today’s political stance and military posturing. Both countries have built national narratives that often emphasize victimhood or mistrust toward the other. This historical framing affects diplomacy, media, and public opinion, making cooperation difficult.
Efforts at peace have often failed because historical grievances are not fully addressed or reconciled, such as cross-border terrorism, water disputes, and past betrayals in negotiations.
Modi Steps In…
It marked a shift in both India’s domestic and international policy framework. His foreign policy strengthened the trajectory initiated in the early 1990s—focused on deepening ties with major global powers, particularly the United States. The objective was to boost India’s economic influence, military capabilities, and global diplomatic standing. This alignment also supported mutual interests: it elevated India’s regional dominance and complemented U.S. strategies concerning Pakistan and China.
Domestically, several influential factors were at play. Modi’s Pakistan policy echoed the long-standing perspective of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) regarding Muslims, Pakistan, and Kashmir—an ideology that heavily shaped Modi’s worldview. However, his influence within the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) extended far beyond the RSS base. Tech-savvy and a master of political messaging, Modi successfully fused the party’s traditional nationalist values with a populist economic vision and a firm stance on Pakistan. This blend expanded not only his personal appeal within the BJP but also increased the party’s national support. Ambassador Lambah had anticipated continuing his backchannel diplomacy under Modi’s leadership.But after a prolonged period of uncertainty, he received a polite rejection. Modi wasn’t interested in negotiations—he intended to confront Pakistan directly. For that, he turned not to Lambah, but to Ajit Doval.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s approach to Pakistan was neither impulsive nor improvised—it was a carefully calibrated plan, executed in stages. Recognizing his controversial global image when he assumed office in 2014, Modi began with a charm offensive aimed at reshaping international perceptions. By inviting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony and later making a surprise visit to Lahore, Modi signaled a desire for rapprochement. These symbolic gestures, amplified by media coverage, were designed to project him as a statesman open to peace.
However, these moves were largely strategic public relations efforts targeting both global audiences and domestic skeptics, including India’s liberal intelligentsia and non-BJP voters. Modi sought to build domestic consensus and international acceptance for his broader, more assertive policy towards Pakistan.
Behind the scenes, Modi was prepared for confrontation, not reconciliation. His government capitalized on Pakistan’s internal civil-military divide and lack of a coherent India policy. Militant attacks in Pathankot and Uri in 2016, for which Pakistan was widely blamed, allowed Modi to present India as a victim of terrorism while avoiding immediate military retaliation. His restraint earned praise abroad and highlighted Pakistan’s instability.
Domestically, these attacks fueled nationalist sentiment. Modi effectively used social and mainstream media to channel public outrage, strengthen his political base, and elevate the role of the military in national security discourse. His actions aligned India more closely with U.S. concerns over Pakistan’s ties with China and its role in Afghanistan.
Ultimately, Modi’s peace overtures served as tactical optics. His decision to suspend talks over minor provocations, such as Pakistan’s engagement with Kashmiri leaders, revealed the hardline intent underlying his diplomacy. His strategy succeeded in isolating Pakistan regionally and uniting Indian political and military establishments behind a tough stance.
“Here comes Jaishankar”…
Jaishankar represents a new phase of Indian diplomacy—firm, unapologetic, and strategically vocal. His stance on Pakistan has consistently emphasized zero tolerance for terrorism, and he has repeatedly stated that “talks and terror cannot go together.” His entry into any discussion about Pakistan often signals India’s hardening stance and a rules-based approach rather than emotional or symbolic diplomacy.Jaishankar is a skilled orator on international platforms, often using global forums to isolate Pakistan diplomatically on issues like cross-border terrorism and to counter Pakistan’s Kashmir narrative. His presence elevates India’s position globally and conveys to Pakistan—and the world—that India will set the terms of engagement. In contrast to earlier efforts marked by back-channel diplomacy or symbolic peace gestures (like Modi’s Lahore visit), Jaishankar’s approach is grounded in realpolitik. His diplomacy suggests that India will only engage Pakistan when conditions are favorable to India’s strategic interests.
Kashmir has become the central focus of India’s agenda… India operates with two distinct but occasionally intersecting strategic frameworks: one for its broader foreign policy, and another specifically for Pakistan. While global diplomacy is shaped by economic interests, corporate influence, and strategic partnerships, India’s Pakistan policy is driven largely by ideological imperatives—particularly Hindutva—and national security concerns.
A key divergence lies in the treatment of Kashmir. For India, the normalization of its control over Jammu and Kashmir has become central, effectively making it the country’s core strategic issue. Dialogue with Pakistan is now contingent upon Islamabad dropping any preconditions related to Kashmir. India’s overarching goal is to eventually secure tacit acceptance from Pakistan of the post-2019 territorial and political realities in Kashmir.
Moreover, India views cross-border militancy and non-state actors as significant threats to its national stability. As long as these issues persist, India sees little reason to engage meaningfully with Pakistan. From New Delhi’s perspective, the benefits of normalizing ties—especially economic—are negligible in the short term, particularly given Pakistan’s limited trade value without a stable Afghanistan or access to Central Asian markets.
Currently, India appears content with maintaining a low-engagement approach, described by some analysts as “minimalism” in relations. In contrast, with mounting economic pressures, the urgency to restore ties may now lie more with Pakistan than with India.
What may change on Pakistan’s side? While India has long maintained that normalization with Pakistan yields limited benefits, Pakistan too had appeared content with the status quo. However, signs now suggest a possible shift in Islamabad’s thinking. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s repeated calls for dialogue—three times within nine months—indicate a growing recognition that continued estrangement may no longer serve Pakistan’s interests.
Pakistan’s internal challenges are mounting. The resurgence of terrorism, particularly from the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch insurgents, has created grave security concerns. In 2022 alone, terrorism-related fatalities spiked by 120%, surpassing even Afghanistan’s tally. These threats, possibly receiving external support, could be mitigated by regional stability—including peace with India.
Strategic parity with India, once central to Pakistan’s posture, is no longer sufficient to address its deeper issues of political instability, economic fragility, and national security. A new approach—starting with limited economic engagement—might serve as a practical opening. While trade alone won’t solve Pakistan’s structural economic problems, it could generate diplomatic goodwill and avoid contentious preconditions such as Kashmir, giving Islamabad strategic leverage.
Former Indian diplomats have also advocated for modest confidence-building measures: restoring diplomatic representation, easing visa rules, and resuming trade discussions. As Shiv Shankar Menon aptly noted, India’s own ambitions could be constrained by a turbulent neighbourhood. Stability in South Asia, beginning with improved India-Pakistan ties, may thus become a strategic necessity for both sides.
Despite clear recognition of the need for dialogue, no significant progress in India-Pakistan relations—whether economic, diplomatic, or political—appears likely in the near future. As former Indian High Commissioner T.C.A. Raghavan observed, while talks are necessary, there is little political will for them in India at present.
With national elections looming—Pakistan’s in 2023 and India’s in 2024—both governments are expected to maintain the current status quo. For Prime Minister Modi, a firm stance on Pakistan has proven electorally beneficial in the past. Sustaining a neutral but flexible posture allows him to escalate tensions or pivot to engagement, depending on political needs.
On the other hand, Pakistan must navigate this interim period cautiously, keeping the door open for post-election progress while focusing inward. Stabilizing its economy, political system, and internal security will be crucial. Without domestic consolidation, meaningful progress in bilateral ties—or in Pakistan’s own development—will remain elusive.
(Written by Muhammad Talha, a BS English Language and Literature student at the International Islamic University, the piece offers a fresh perspective on one of South Asia’s most enduring challenges.)
“Is long-term normalization between Pakistan and India an unreachable prospect?”
